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Abstract
Convergent scientific realism entails that science will sooner or later
arrive at the final theory of the fundamental constituents of matter. At that
stage, all fundamental truths about nature will be discovered so that the
search for basic principle seems bound to come to a halt. I explore options for
a non-convergent scientific realism that allows for sustained progress in basic
research. I defend the views that the coherence of non-convergent realism
requires an emergence claim and that this claim can be supported. I develop
the example of the relation between equivalence classes among biological
functions and their physiological realizations. Given strongly emergent laws
in the sense elaborated in the paper, progress in basic research may survive
the discovery of the laws governing the tinymost parts of matter.
Keywords: emergence, final theory, functional explanation, scientific
realism.
Science is faced with an ever-changing variety of challenges. New issues
arise constantly, and science is thought to provide the standard toolkit for
their treatment. Science progresses at a quick pace; it fuels technological
change and induces profound transformations in economy and society as a
whole. The question I wish to address is whether this advance motion can
last. Ongoing scientific progress presupposes that nature is structured in a
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suitable way. I wish to clarify what these conditions on the part of nature are
like – or what it takes to make scientific progress sustainable.
1.  Scientific Realism, the Exhaustion of Nature, and the Final Theory 
What could possibly bring progress to a halt is the demands we place on
it. We want substantial improvement, not mere change. And we want it with
respect to the principles, not just some derivative elements. Without such
constraints progress would be easy to get by piling up trivia. We could
painstakingly register the facts as they occur, describing each facet in as
detailed a fashion as humanly possible. Since exact replication is rare, we
may trust that such a collection of truths would grow unabatedly. But this
type of unlimited advance is less than thrilling. The ongoing accumulation of
insipid reports is a cause of concern rather than delight. We want interesting
novelty. I take it that scientific knowledge is distinguished, roughly speaking,
by its unifying power and its reliability. Scientific theories are worthwhile in
virtue of their conceptual and empirical achievements. Unification means
that a few principles are sufficient for dealing with a large array of facts in a
precise manner. Reliability presupposes that these principles are well-tested.
In order to be acceptable, scientific theories are required to satisfy demanding
criteria or pass severe tests of a kind which these theories can be expected to
fail if they are wrong. This methodological lesson is equally part of the works
of Imre Lakatos, Larry Laudan, and Deborah Mayo (Lakatos 1970, 31-47;
Laudan 1990, 18-19; Mayo 1996, 7-11, 174-187). Scientific progress is cons-
tituted by the growth of knowledge thus distinguished. 
A further issue is which empirical and conceptual virtues of theoretical
claims, if any, justify the acceptance of such claims as representing reality.
According to scientific realism, the principles of successful, or outstandingly
successful, theories refer to truly existing objects, causal processes or natu-
ral kinds. Elsewhere I have argued for a brand of scientific realism which
invokes a particular type of excellence, namely, strong success. A strongly
successful theory is distinguished by the correct prediction of novel effects or
the anticipation of novel relations among relevant phenomena. The basis of a
realist interpretation of strongly successful theories is the so-called miracle
argument. It states that achievements of this kind are to count as “miracles,”
i.e., as utterly mysterious and inexplicable, unless it is assumed that the theory
in question has captured the pertinent features of reality truthfully. An infe-
rence to the best explanation justifies the assumption that there is some truth
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in such theories (Carrier 1991, 24-28; Carrier 1993, 403-404; Carrier 2003). 
The credentials of this argument do not really matter. It suffices to take
into account that there is a large number of devoted and practicing realists. In
particular, the vast majority of scientists and philosophers of science sub-
scribe to the view that at least some theories in the mature sciences are relia-
ble enough to be trusted ontologically. Such theories are approximately true,
and if a theory thus distinguished refers to certain entities, processes, or natu-
ral kinds these are rightly assumed to form part of the inventory of nature. 
Scientific realism usually includes views about the progress of science. It
is assumed that science manages to come closer to the truth about the natu-
ral world. This notion of convergent realism suggests that science increa-
singly exhausts nature in epistemic respect. If science is assumed to success-
fully approach reality, it should be done sooner or later. Science should reach
a point at which all existing entities are uncovered and their properties and
relations truthfully captured. Consequently, scientific realism faces the
prospect that progress in fundamental research will come to an end. It entails
the vision of a final theory for which there is nothing left to unveil. All fun-
damental matters will be settled. The particle physicist Steven Weinberg has
famously advocated this conclusion. He observes a strikingly convergent pat-
tern of “arrows of explanation.” Generalizations are explained by more com-
prehensive theories and again by deeper principles. And wherever you start
asking for the causes of physical, chemical, or biological phenomena,
answers will eventually draw on particle interactions and thus rely on the
standard model of particle physics (Weinberg 1992, 19, 32). History of scien-
ce exhibits the same convergence. The historical succession of more com-
prehensive and more unified theories can be expected to approach the final
theory where the level of maximum depth is reached and the search for fun-
damental principles completed (Weinberg 1992, 231-232, 235). 
It deserves emphasis that arrival at this stage of completion does not
necessarily mean the end of science, not even the end of basic science, that
is, epistemically oriented and not primarily application-driven research.
Rather, the prospect of a saturated science squares with Richard Feynman’s
“chess model” of progress. The rules of chess are completely known; no-
thing new will ever turn up at the fundamental level. And yet new chess
games can be played unlimitedly. Likewise, if all the fundamental laws of
nature were in, we could still go on to explore their consequences forever
(Horgan 1996, 175-176; see Rescher 1978, 40-41). The chess model high-
lights the fact that the completion of fundamental science, which is targeting
the tinymost constituents of matter, would leave large chunks of purely epis-
Revista de Filosofía
Vol. 28 Núm. 1 (2003): 7-31 
9
Martin Carrier Emergence and the Final Theory...
carrier.qxd  27/10/2003  9:12  Página 9
temically oriented science unaffected. Still, the chess model precludes the
unlimited continuation of progress in fundamental matters. Given the final
theory, the system of the world is complete. 
This consideration brings out the tension between the realist claim that
scientific theories reliably penetrate the inner workings of nature and the
notion of ongoing scientific progress. Barring Blaise Pascal’s vision of an
endless series of worlds within worlds – distinguished by charm rather than
credibility –, there is a distinguished, fundamental layer of entities or pro-
cesses. Once this layer of reality is understood, basic science will be confined
to tracing the consequences of this final theory. Nothing new will ever arise
at this deepest epistemic level, and fundamental science will come to an end.
It is at this juncture that the conflict between scientific realism and the notion
of incessant progress breaks out. The issue I wish to address is whether sus-
tained accumulation of fundamental or ultimate truths about the universe is
possible. I want to elaborate how to give a coherent account of non-exhaus-
tive, realistically construed progress in basic matters. 
2.  Changing Values for Resuscitating Stagnant Science 
Laudan’s reticulational model of scientific rationality places the agree-
ment of aims, methodological rules, and scientific theories at the focus.
Methodological rules state means-end relations; they specify procedures that
are supposed to promote the aims of science in light of what the world is like.
Such rules are justified on account of their appropriateness to reaching cer-
tain aims or goals, and Laudan claimed that goals of science have been sub-
ject to alteration over the past centuries. Galileo and Descartes aspired to a
rational mechanics, guided by the ideal of intelligibility. Newton failed to fit
gravitation into the mechanistic framework and switched over to the goal of
empirically proven knowledge. Early in the 19th century unobservable enti-
ties such as electric charges or magnetic fields were included in the realm of
science, and the understanding of these entities was accepted as a major goal
of research (Laudan 1984, 42-66). 
The reticulational model suggests a way out of the gloomy scenario of
science in its barren end state: if a goal is reached, adopt another one! The
allegedly final state could simply be taken as an indication of a lack of ima-
gination as to what science can accomplish. So, here’s the recipe for reani-
mation: change values. Abandon the old-fashioned aims of science and adopt
fresh ones. This is by no means an abstract consideration. In fact, we are wit-
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nessing two endeavors that can be interpreted along these lines: the virtues of
emancipation and control have gained prominence in some quarters and are
intended to replace traditional criteria like unification or reliability. These
approaches can be viewed as attempts to open up new horizons for science as
a whole – with the no doubt unintended effect to make room for substantial
progress regarding the principles. 
Emancipation is among the prime commitments of social constructivists
of all sorts. Scientific theories, the argument runs, are always underdeter-
mined by available evidence. Experience fails to single out one theory as the
correct one. There is room for choice which needs to be filled by appeal to
non-empirical criteria. But if non-empirical considerations are to be drawn on
anyway, we should bring to bear the right ones, which means, values we
share. Political factors have frequently been claimed to influence the devel-
opment of science. But social constructivists go one step further: scientists
should take political values into consideration when accepting a theory.
Theory choice should be guided, among other things, by the goal of promot-
ing justice in society (see Koertge 2000, S49-S53). 
Control is a second keyword, indicative of changing axiological commit-
ments. Large areas of modern research are characterized by application dom-
inance. That is, theoretical innovations do not respond to epistemically rele-
vant challenges but are intended to promote economic goals and eventually
to produce marketable goods. The aim is to control phenomena for the bene-
fit of humankind – or a particular company. The interests and demands of
future users shape the research agenda of a scientific discipline. Chemistry or
parts of biology provide examples. Research is a matter of designing mole-
cules for a given purpose or of blocking the spread of a disease. 
It has been observed that application-dominated science develops a
characteristic pattern of explanation. Comprehensive theories are rarely
invoked; more common is a problem-specific approach. Context-dependent
local models are predominant (Gibbons et al. 1994, 14, 23, 28-30, 43-44).
Problems of practical importance, such as the appropriate array of fields in a
fusion reactor or the mechanism of high-temperature superconductivity, are
frequently treated using phenomenological models that are only loosely con-
nected to quantum mechanics as the pertinent fundamental theory. Rather,
such models are governed by assumptions specific to the issue at hand. As a
result, a compartmentalized structure of disparate models is generated, mo-
dels that lack a unifying bond. Similarly, application dominated science is
said to aim at contextualized causal relations. On this understanding, all that
needs to be done is, for example, to identify the gene that triggers certain
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physiological processes and can thus be employed to produce a desired
effect. The causal chains or mechanisms that connect the trigger with the out-
come are ignored. What matters is to identify the levers to be pulled; how
they are connected with the results is considered a subtlety that can safely be
neglected (Fox Keller 2000, 141-142). 
Research projects of this sort are shaped by practical concerns and
involve the renunciation of a genuinely epistemic commitment. We are faced
with an engineering approach in which the proper functioning of certain
devices is the sole criterion of adequacy for the underlying conception.
Whether such a conception fits in with the wider nomological or causal
framework is not considered important. If it works everything’s fine. 
The lesson to be drawn from these two examples is that changing values
can backfire. Rather than breaking new ground for science, the ideal of
knowledge is sacrificed for power, for the capacity to act politically or tech-
nologically. But an epistemic commitment is essential to science. In this vein,
both alternative approaches to science reintroduce a gulf that was originally
bridged by Francis Bacon, the gulf between knowledge and power, or
between nature and art (i.e., technology). This is a high price to pay for resus-
citating stagnant science. Changing values might amount to abandoning epis-
temic values of prime importance, such as reliability and unification.
Accordingly, what at first appeared as a way of relieving an allegedly com-
plete science of the burden of past achievements now seems more like a
serious limitation. It could lead to renouncing the goals of knowledge and
epistemic progress. Progress isn’t saved, it’s abolished. Science isn’t that
malleable, after all; it is bound to stick to epistemic commitments. 
3.  Complexity and the Final Theory 
The assumption of a final theory is intertwined with a reductionist view
of the structure of science. The axioms of this theory are supposed to account
for the features of all relevant entities and processes at all higher levels of
complexity.1 Weinberg’s vision of a final theory explicitly endorses a reduc-
tive relationship between the totality of physical entities and processes and
the standard model of particle physics (Weinberg 1992, 51-58). Commitment
to the finite character of basic research is assumed to involve the following
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contentions. There is a set of fundamental laws applying to the most elemen-
tary constituents of matter. This set accommodates the sum total of entities
and processes in the world, and it cannot be traced back to further principles.
This relation of accommodation is unanimously taken to include some sort of
“in-principle explanation.” The “in principle” proviso is supposed to take
care of instances where we have reason to believe that the failure to fit them
into the final theory is due to human, rather than factual, limitations. 
These considerations show that the assumption of the existence of a final
theory brings certain commitments in its train. In particular, these commit-
ments restrict the range of admissible patterns of scientific progress. These
patterns have to be compatible with the chess model (see sec. 1): The laws
governing the fundamental entities and processes unambiguously determine
everything that happens in the universe. But elaborating the bearing of these
laws on the multifarious events and intricate processes found in nature may
take endless pains. 
The first thing to be noted is the import of the “in principle” clause added
to the claim of comprehensive explainability. Human epistemic frailty is no
justification for denying “in principle” explicability. Deterministic chaos, for
instance, agrees well with the chess model and is compatible with the com-
mitment to a final theory. The fundamental laws of chaotic systems are com-
pletely known; only their consequences are difficult to trace. Thus, mere
complexity does not provide a sufficient reason for denying explanatory
dependence. The same goes for the instrumentalist conception of biology as
advocated by Alexander Rosenberg. It is because of human inability to keep
track of all the molecules that collectively make up an organism, that bio-
logical features cannot be derived from the fundamental laws of physics
(Rosenberg 1994, Chap. 1). But explicability is maintained “in principle”:
biological features are supposed to be determined by the behavior of micro-
constituents. Rosenberg’s biological instrumentalism squares with the com-
mitment to a final theory. 
Another type of relationship between theories or explanations that agrees
with reductionism and finitism is “weak emergence.” This notion suggests a
layered structure with different properties and processes at each level. The
idea is that, while the relevant entities are governed by diverse laws, these
laws can eventually be traced back to the same body of fundamental laws. If
weak emergence obtains, it is still possible to account for the relevant prop-
erties and processes “in principle” by the laws governing elementary entities
and their interactions. For instance, the bond between the oxygen atoms with-
in an oxygen molecule is of covalent nature and produced by a quantum
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mechanical effect of electron sharing, while the bond between oxygen mole-
cules is brought about by electric forces which arise from fluctuations in the
electron densities of the atoms. Similarly, the atoms within a protein molecule
are held together by covalent and ionic bonds, whereas the bond between pro-
tein molecules depends on their spatial shapes. In general, the processes with-
in a system may be due to mechanisms or laws different from those that go-
vern the interaction between such systems. Complexity demands recourse to
different explanatory resources at various levels of organization. 
However, nothing in this account is in conflict with reductionism. At the
end of the day, all these diverse laws may well be reducible to the principles
governing the behavior of micro-constituents. In fact, the various mecha-
nisms of chemical bonding can all be explained by quantum theory (if gloss-
ing over some subtle difficulties is granted). Weak emergence entails nothing
that could rule out such a reductive relationship. No in-principle gaps sepa-
rate the higher-level features from the fundamental entities and processes.
Weak emergence can be accommodated by the chess model. 
Likewise, most of the arguments Nicholas Rescher advances in favor of
perpetual progress leave the chess model unscathed. These arguments fail to
rule out a notion of progress according to which an unchanged set of princi-
ples is unceasingly elaborated. Rescher draws support for unlimited progress
from methodological features of science, which means, conversely, that the
arguments are supposed to remain unaffected by assumptions about the struc-
ture of nature. The distinguishing feature of Rescher’s approach is the
attempt to establish the unboundedness claim by considering the way scien-
ce proceeds; the way nature operates need not be taken into account. The
endlessness of scientific progress does not require limitlessness on the side of
the objects, which means that no infinitude of nature needs to be postulated.
It is rather the structure of the information-acquiring processes that speaks in
favor of incessant progress (Rescher 1999, 81). For reasons of succinctness I
select for scrutiny the two most widely received arguments to this effect,
namely, the argument from “erotetic propagation” and the argument from the
interactive character of the growth of scientific knowledge. 
First, Rescher’s claim is that answering questions engenders new ques-
tions. It follows that scientific discoveries create new problems which in their
turn keep scientific research afloat. The mechanism of erotetic propagation is
supposed to work as follows. Posing a question commits one to certain pre-
suppositions on which the legitimacy and propriety of this question rest. If
the atomic weight of a given element is at issue, it is presupposed that there
are atoms with certain weights. The answer to a question is integrated into the
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system of knowledge and hence constitutes a presupposition of further ques-
tions. That is, the answer changes factual assumptions underlying future
research and thus makes new questions possible. 
The alternative to answering a question is to dismiss it, that is, to reject it
as being ill-posed. This happens if one of the presuppositions of the question
is denied by the pertinent theory. For instance, in present-day science it is
inappropriate to ask for the properties of phlogiston, caloric or the luminife-
rous ether. Disallowing questions requires removal of their presuppositions
from the system of knowledge. And the reorientation going along with this
process entails theoretical innovation and, hence, progress – or so the argu-
ment runs. 
Finally, it is also possible that a question remains unanswered and thus
contributes all the more to promoting progress. After all, such a question pro-
vides a constant stimulus for working out new theoretical approaches and
thus advances scientific innovation. 
In sum, the three possible ways of dealing with a question, namely,
answering it, dismissing it and leaving it open, all induce theoretical change.
The conclusion is that scientific theory is bound to rejuvenate itself conti-
nually. Scientific method belongs in every toolkit of anti-aging procedures
(Rescher 1999, 5-18; see Ruetsche 2000, 65-66). 
But even if this threefold argument is granted, it does not demolish the
notion of a final theory. The abundance of new questions does not imply the
overthrow of the fundamental axioms. Nothing in the argument entails that
the answers given to these incessantly arising questions affect the principles
of natural science, i.e., the assumed final theory. These answers may well
refer to remote theoretical details and lack all general bearing. In order to rule
out a final theory, it is not sufficient to establish ongoing theoretical change.
What is needed is unceasing revolutionary change. But Rescher’s argument
fails to rule out the possibility that the questions and answers endlessly crop-
ping up in science are fairly trivial, easily answered and bereft of all rele-
vance to the foundations of science (Almeder 1992, 215). 
Actually, this type of progress, which is allowed by Rescher’s account,
squares nicely with the chess model. After all, there is no natural end to the
series of chess problems and their solutions. Pondering new chess problems
certainly contributes to a deeper understanding of what the rules of chess
imply. But the rules themselves remain fixed and final. Likewise, all the new
questions and answers generated by Rescher’s erotetic propagation mecha-
nism may concern subtle ramifications of the final principles, without invol-
ving their overthrow. 
The second one of Rescher’s chief arguments for unending progress
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draws on human intervention in nature. This argument from interaction right-
ly stresses that science only rarely registers what happens in untamed nature.
Science produces its evidential basis through active interference with phe-
nomena of interest; science “twists the lion’s tail,” as Bacon reportedly
remarked (Hacking 1983, 149, 246). Experimental science is technology-dri-
ven, and technological innovation should break new empirical ground. New
data arise from the application of increasingly advanced instruments, and the
challenge to accommodate these data is met by thinking up novel theoretical
systems (Rescher 1978, 45-46, 52, 134-136; Rescher 1999, 81-82). 
Again, this argument fails to establish that the evidence procured by
novel instruments and experiments is of a kind different from the kinds
already known. It remains possible that our increasingly sophisticated equip-
ment merely serves to uncover more of the same. Think of the improvement
of analytical tools in chemistry. As far as I can see, this sort of technological
refinement has generated no substantial revision of fundamental chemical
doctrines. Rescher’s interactive approach to scientific progress is not suffi-
cient for giving support to the idea of perpetual change in fundamental mat-
ters. His approach does not demonstrate that the principles of natural science
continue to be overturned and replaced by principles of a different sort. This
means that Rescher’s approach is compatible with the chess model and, con-
sequently, with the prospect of a final theory. 
4.  Emergence: Classical, Weak, and Strong 
These considerations show that complexity simpliciter is insufficient for
underwriting continual progress in fundamental matters. Complexity may
produce mere difference among levels of organization without implying any
kind of opposition between the pertinent explanatory resources. A motor car
and a jet engine use different mechanisms of propagation, but both can be
explained by the same set of mechanical and chemical principles. Only in-
principle diversity could give progress in basic matters another chance. 
Unlike weak emergence, the relation of classical emergence, as intro-
duced by Charles D. Broad in 1925, is suitable for outlining a structure of
explanatory layers which are separated by strict boundaries. Owing to some
in-principle constraint, emergent properties of a composite system cannot be
explained by the properties of its constituents and their interrelations. To be
sure, the properties of the composite system are determined by those of its
components; no additional factors intervene. Yet it is impossible to account
Revista de Filosofía
Vol. 28 Núm. 1 (2003): 7-31
16
Martin Carrier Emergence and the Final Theory...
carrier.qxd  27/10/2003  9:13  Página 16
for some of the qualities of the whole on the basis of the characteristics of the
parts by relying on comprehensive laws. One of Broad’s examples concerns
the chemical transformation of hydrogen and oxygen into water. As water can
be generated reliably from the elements, the latter are sufficient for bringing
about the compound. Yet the chemistry of Broad’s time did not contain the
slightest clue to the way this drastic property change is produced. It appeared
utterly mysterious how two gases could bring about a liquid. Thus, emergent
properties differ qualitatively from the properties of their respective bases but
are still lawfully related to them. However, this specific lawful relation can-
not be explained by overarching theoretical principles (Broad 1925, 58-66). 
The features of classical emergence are effective determination and
explanatory limitation. As a matter of fact, base properties fix emergent fea-
tures but the latter cannot adequately be accounted for by exclusively draw-
ing on the former. The occurrence of qualitatively different properties in
complex systems only justifies an emergence claim if these properties, first,
cannot be traced back to properties of the parts along with their interactions,
and, second, if this failure arises from an in-principle deficiency. Weak emer-
gence involves a qualitative difference between relevant properties as well as
effective determination. But this difference is amenable to treatment by over-
arching theoretical principles. By contrast, classical emergence involves
nomological mavericks, cut off from the system of knowledge. The particu-
lar laws governing the production of classically emergent properties are con-
sidered “brute,” “unique,” and “ultimate.” Broad approvingly quotes Samuel
Alexander’s recommendation to accept emergent properties with an attitude
of “natural piety” (Broad 1925, 55); they can only be registered but not
explained. 
The notion of classical emergence suffers from a lack of persuasive
examples. Its alleged instances have vanished since Broad’s time. In particu-
lar, quantum chemistry has proved able to account for supposedly inexplica-
ble property changes. This is no accident; the situation envisaged by Broad
seems intrinsically unstable. Science essentially aims to integrate seemingly
isolated relations into a nomological framework. Gradually a theory is built
around an initially odd effect. Let’s adapt Broad’s scenario so as to take
scientific striving for unification into consideration. Assume we end up with
a number of disparate theories which apply to different properties of the same
objects: none of these theories is reducible to another one, nor can they be
integrated into one coherent network (other than by trivial conjunction). I call
this type of relation “strong emergence.” 
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5.  Strong Emergence: New Vistas of Progress in Basic Matters 
Strong emergence breaks the confines of the chess model of progress.
Assume we are faced with a complete final theory which comprehensively
accounts for the behavior of the fundamental parts of matter. This theory fails
to comprise the emergent features of composite systems which are character-
ized by their inexplainability by the laws pertaining to their respective con-
stituents. As a matter of definition, strongly emergent properties are beyond
the scope of a final theory in this sense. I call a law ultimate if it cannot be
traced back to deeper principles; an ultimate law is not derivable from any
deeper truth. The chess model entails that the fundamental laws, referring to
the most elementary entities and their interactions, coincide with the ultimate
laws. By contrast, strong emergentism implies that there are ultimate laws of
composite systems, that is, ultimate but non-fundamental laws. Such emer-
gent laws are not obtained by applying the final theory to these systems.
Basic research does not adopt a chess-like structure since the final theory
fails to provide all the rules of the game. 
In this framework, distinctly holistic properties and laws are assumed for
complex objects, even though such objects are taken to be “nothing but”
aggregates of their parts. These higher-level features are not derivative but
ultimate themselves – in spite of applying to composite and structured aggre-
gates. Complex objects provide a field of basic research even after the most
minute particles are detected and their interactions recorded. Within the
emergentist framework, and in contrast to the chess model, complexity
ensures the ongoing character of basic scientific progress even after the
advent of a complete fundamental theory (Carrier 2000b, 100-101). The
question is, however: can strong emergence avoid the emptiness that invali-
dated classical emergence? Conversely speaking: on which feature could an
in-principle nonreducibility claim be based? This is my suggestion: recipro-
cal heterogeneous multiplicity. 
6. Benefits of Mutual Assistance or, the Reciprocal Unification of
Biological Functions and their Physiological Realizations 
Multiple realization is one of the salient features of biological and men-
tal phenomena. Take biological functions and physiological realizations as
examples. For instance, the function of establishing communication among
cells or within cells is performed by so-called signal molecules. These mes-
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senger molecules are chemically distinct or even heterogeneous; they may be
proteins, amino acids, fatty acid derivatives, and many more (Kincaid 1990,
584). The heterogeneity of this class of realizations means that there is no
chemical criterion for singling out the relevant entities. The uniform function
of biological signaling is realized by divergent chemical processes which
cannot be identified on the sole basis of their chemical properties (Carrier
2000a, 182-183). 
Multiple realization was taken to block reducibility, but its bearing has
diminished under the force of recent criticism. It is argued that even in cases
of multiple realization the properties of interest (functions or higher-level
features in general) are unambiguously fixed by properties of the parts and
their interactions. Furthermore, explaining higher-level features in terms of
the interactions of the pertinent fundamental entities provides us with the
comprehensive picture. Nothing is left unexplained. It is true, such a micro-
explanation may contain superfluous details. When signaling is at issue, the
molecular particulars may be irrelevant. But saying more than was asked for
doesn’t invalidate the explanation. The fundamental story is the true story,
and all higher-level accounts arise from human cognitive constraints and do
not exhibit any objective superiority (Rosenberg 1994, Chap. 2; Sober 1999,
546-549). 
Whatever the import of this criticism may be, multiple realization is not
the only obstacle to reduction. The converse aspect is important as well: a
given entity may perform a variety of functions. One of the reasons for this
variety is the intrusion of additional factors. Whether or not a signal molecule
does its duty depends on the presence of suitable receptors and a host of other
conditions. The function of an object or process is context-dependent in that
it may be altered or vitiated by external circumstances (Kincaid 1990, 579,
581-582). However, there is another, further-reaching variability of function.
One and the same object or process may fulfill varied, or even heterogeneous,
functions under identical conditions. 
My claim is that there is a multiplicity of heterogeneous realizations of
the same functions and at the same time a multiplicity of heterogeneous func-
tions of the same objects or processes. The origin of breathing is a case in
point. According to one of the evolutionary accounts presently on offer, the
development of breathing was initiated by the spread of green plants. Owing
to the increasing intensity of photosynthesis, the atmospheric oxygen content
grew. But oxygen is chemically aggressive and tends to destroy organic mol-
ecules that are critical to the survival of organisms. Evolution thus developed
a means of neutralizing the toxic impact of oxygen atoms (or “free radicals”):
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oxygen compounds were formed that are chemically more inert and do less
or no damage to an organism. As a result, energy was gained as a side-effect
of detoxification, and breathing became a chief source of metabolic energy
supply. 
Consequently, the process of oxide formation in organisms serves two
different ends. The two functions of detoxification and energy supply are ful-
filled at the same time under the same circumstances. Moreover, these ends
are clearly heterogeneous; there is no functional criterion that could establish
an equivalence relation between them while leaving out other functions
which are not connected with oxide formation (such as hormone level con-
trol or biological clock). Conversely, each of these two functions can be per-
formed using different mechanisms. Energy can also be supplied by anaero-
bic decomposition of carbohydrates or by photosynthesis. And the dangerous
effects of oxygen could also be blocked by compounds formed through
endothermic reactions. This shows that the various chemical realizations of
the same function may not only be different but heterogeneous. Drawing on
chemical criteria alone while ignoring the functional aspects of energy gain,
it is impossible to identify the relevant set of processes, namely, breathing,
anaerobic decomposition, and photosynthesis (and at the same time leaving
out other reactions that are similar in chemical respects). Similarly, it is
impossible to distinguish harmless from potentially damaging oxides on
exclusively chemical grounds. What is needed, in addition, is an appeal to
functional features such as toxicity. 
This shows that one and the same object or mechanism may perform a
variety of functions under the same environmental conditions. Functional
diversity is not always due to an intrusion of additional influences. Oxide for-
mation serves two heterogeneous functions simultaneously. Conversely, each
of the functions could be realized by various heterogeneous mechanisms. In
sum, we are faced with reciprocal heterogeneous multiplicity. 
This is a wide-spread characteristic that extends to a large number of bio-
logical processes. Originally, wings were presumably selected as thermore-
gulatory devices, that is, as a means of cooling the relevant organism. And
they operated as aerodynamic devices afterward; they improved the capacity
to fly. The human brain constitutes another example. On the one hand, it
clearly serves a multitude of different, or even heterogeneous, purposes,
reaching from spatial orientation to melody recognition. On the other hand,
higher cognitive faculties may alternatively be realized by a von-Neumann
scheme of the kind underlying common digital computers or by neural net-
works. There are marked contrasts between the relevant mechanisms and
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implementations. All in all, the physiological processes in the brain serve a
multitude of functions, and each of these functions may be realized diffe-
rently. 
Reciprocal heterogeneous multiplicity between functions and their real-
izations entails the following peculiarity: Unifying a set of functions may
require recourse to the realizations of these functions, and unifying a set of
physical entities may demand appeal to the functions these entities fulfill.
Given that a function is realized by heterogeneous mechanisms, similarity
among the mechanisms is exclusively grounded on their functional equiva-
lence. Given that an entity performs heterogeneous functions, similarity
among the functions exclusively rests on sameness of realization. What is
equal in functional respects may be disparate physically; and what is of the
same kind physically may be diverse functionally. The equivalence classes of
functions and their realizations cross-classify each other.2
The emergent property arising from this feature is sameness in kind.
Functional concepts serve to unify physical entities that remain heteroge-
neous at the physical level. Conversely, physical concepts contribute to uni-
fying functions that are heterogeneous at the functional level. Functional con-
cepts like “detoxification” and “energy supply” lump together physically dis-
tinct instances and make overarching explanations possible. On the level of
relevant mechanisms, such uniform explanations crumble into physically dis-
parate pieces. Without a functional bond, breathing, anaerobic processes, and
photosynthesis constitute quite distinct chemical processes. Conversely, the
different functions of one and the same mechanism make it clear that
recourse to the realizations allows a particular type of unified explanation as
well. Restriction to functions would fail to grasp that it is the same physical
object or process that is responsible for a whole class of functionally dis-
parate effects. One needs the physical level to understand that the function of
detoxification is realized by the same mechanism as the function of energy
supply. 
This mutual explanatory dependence does not extend to particular
instances of functions and their realizations. There is no general difficulty to
understand that and how a given mechanism performs a specific function.
Similarly, the ascription of functions may rest on the discovery of relevant
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mechanisms. For example, identifying the recognition of shape, color and
motion as the three distinctive features of perception is motivated by the fact
that these three functions are realized by physiologically different mecha-
nisms. Regarding particular cases, the connection between functions and
realizations may be fairly direct, close, and unproblematic. 
But the argument is not concerned with particular cases but with classes
of entities and processes of the same kind. The issue is unification, and the
claim is, first, that functional concepts are needed for unifying physically he-
terogeneous processes and, second, that physical concepts are required for
giving a coherent account of functionally heterogeneous achievements. Note
the symmetry of the conceptual situation. There is explanatory gain in either
direction. Some explanations of similarity or sameness in kind can only be
given by drawing on conceptual means supplied from outside. Sometimes
unification demands outsourcing. But this entails that some explanations can-
not be traced back to particle physics. Some accounts of similarity among
physical entities need appeal to higher-level functional concepts. Biology and
psychology, as disciplines that make extensive use of functions, tend to
remain uncovered by the grand unification of particle physics. 
7.  Naturalized Functions and the Renewal of Epistemic Resources 
The point of the argument is that appeals to functions as well as to phy-
sical mechanisms accomplish explanations that transcend the resources of the
other level. This means that functional and physical theories cannot be
reduced to one another since each accomplishes specific explanatory gains
that cannot be matched by exclusive appeal to the conceptual resources of the
other. Moreover, functional and physical approaches are distinct: the former
disregard mechanisms and the latter are too fine-grained to capture the over-
arching functional level. Functional and physical accounts do not form a
coherent whole; they can only be unified by trivial conjunction. As regards
explanation of sameness in kind, we are faced with a case of strong emer-
gence. 
Adding a separate layer of functions to the fundamental level of micro-
particles and their interactions opens up new vistas for progress. Some phe-
nomena escape the explanatory grip of the final theory. But this new spec-
trum of discoveries makes room for progress in the realistic sense of unco-
vering nature only on the condition that functions are part of the inventory of
nature. If functions are to underwrite the prospects of a continued unveiling
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of nature’s contrivances, functions need to be naturalized. Otherwise, one
could conceive of functions as mere instrumentalist devices or regulative
principles: functions do not exist in reality; they are nothing but conceptual
inventions for a better understanding of the phenomena (Ratcliffe 2000, 118-
119). In addition, such a naturalistic conception has to leave room for ascrib-
ing more than one function to a given entity or process. Only on that condi-
tion would the claimed multiplicity of functions and mechanisms be an
objective feature of nature. In fact, the two mainstream approaches to func-
tions are equally naturalistic and permit reciprocal multiplicity. On both
approaches, functional explanations have realist import. 
According to the etiological theory, the function of an object is the rea-
son for its existence. The function of a biological structure is the effect which
it was selected for and which explains why it is there (Wright 1973; see
McLaughlin 2001, Chap. 5). A narrow etiological theory acknowledges only
a single function: the reason for the genesis of a particular structure. A more
ecumenical version takes functions as the effects that are responsible for the
“origin or maintenance” of a structure3. This clause allows the inclusion of
those effects among the functions of a biological structure that grant a selec-
tive advantage at present, and not merely during its formation. 
Assume that detoxification was the effect which oxide formation was
originally selected for so that energy supply is a side-effect. Suppose further
that organisms developed more intricate and efficient procedures for getting
rid of potentially damaging free oxygen (this is actually the case). If only
detoxification had been at stake, breathing would have been discarded as a
superfluous and costly procedure. This means that the biological reason for
its sustained existence is a former side-effect, namely, energy supply. A more
comprehensive reading of the etiological theory suggests that both effects
qualify as naturalized functions. 
The second chief approach to functions draws on the “causal role” of
processes. More specifically, the operation of a system is represented as a
sequence or interaction of a number of subsystems each of which is charac-
terized by the task it performs. A suitable property of a system is explained
in terms of the capacities of its components. To ascribe a function to an enti-
ty or process means to impute a capacity to it which contributes to generat-
ing a characteristic of the wider system that encompasses the entity or
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process in question. The function of the kidney is represented by its capacity
to remove metabolic waste from blood because the performance of this task
contributes to the survival or continued activity of the relevant organism. The
capacities invoked by a substantial causal-role analysis are required to be less
sophisticated than and different in type from the feature analyzed and exhib-
it a complex organization (Cummins 1975, 759-765; see McLaughlin 2001,
Chap. 6). 
Carl Craver rightly emphasized that causal-role functions can only be
attributed to organized systems which are characterized by a complex
arrangement of their component capacities. In such systems the components
and their activities cannot be interchanged arbitrarily without disturbing the
performance of the embedding system. The causal role of a component qual-
ifies as a function only on the condition that this role cannot be intersubsti-
tuted with that of another component picked at random while maintaining the
operation of the whole. If you replace a kidney with a heart, the removal of
metabolic waste will suffer. Any such replacement has to meet strict demands
if the activity of the organism is to remain unaffected (Craver 2001, 59). 
This condition states that functions are only fulfilled by parts of orga-
nized wholes. Accordingly, it is ruled out to regard it as a function of a drop
of water to enlarge the volume of the oceans. A causal role of that sort
remains unchanged by arbitrary intersubstitutions: any randomly chosen drop
could make the same causal contribution. 
But more than organization is required to make causal-role functions an
objective feature. On the face of it, every property of an organized system can
be understood as resulting from interactions between component capacities
and can consequently be subjected to a functional explanation. For example,
the suitability of the human nose for supporting glasses could be taken as one
of its functions, because this causal role undoubtedly contributes to improv-
ing many people’s performance. It seems that there are no natural limits to
the ascription of causal-role functions. Each property can apparently be
accounted for functionalistically by conjuring up suitable capacities. The
identification of causal-role functions seems to rest on judgments about what
properties are significant. This relativization of function ascriptions appears
to thwart the naturalization of causal-role functions (Craver 2001, 71). 
Ascertaining the objectivity of functional explanations requires restrict-
ing the properties that can possibly be accounted for by attributing causal
roles. The most plausible option is to proceed as in the etiological approach
and to limit function ascriptions to properties that can be attributed to bio-
logical evolution. That is, such ascriptions are limited to properties related to
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biological fitness in Darwin’s original sense: only those features can be ana-
lyzed by imputing causal roles that improves the prospect of survival or
reproduction of the corresponding organism (Weber 2003, sec. 2.5). The
appeal to biological evolution supports the claim that the pursuit of these
goals is the result of the causal process of natural selection. Survival and
reproduction are goals internal to an organism and can be naturalized by
referring to biological processes. Moreover, survival and reproduction con-
stitute two distinct goals and thus make it possible to ascribe more than one
functional contribution to a given entity. 
Construed in this way, the causal-role approach, no less than the etiolo-
gical theory, yields the two features of functions I need: multiplicity and
objectivity. Biological processes like oxide formation may contribute in more
than one respect to the appropriate operation of an organism. And they may
do so objectively. Assigning a function to a process involves the factual
claims that this process actually produces the relevant effect and that this
effect increases the fitness of the corresponding organism. It is a fact that
oxygen compound formation contributes to neutralizing free radicals and
serves as an energy source. Both capacities exist and they are relevant to the
survival and reproduction of organisms. Thus, both can legitimately be
employed in a functional analysis. 
Consequently, the etiological theory and the causal-role account equally
accept functions as part of nature and allow for a multiplicity of functions of
the same entity or process. Functions are naturalized within each approach,
and they come out as real and multiple. In virtue of their realist import, func-
tions can underwrite strong emergence. That is, the strongly emergent rela-
tions between functions and their realizations are part of nature’s modes of
operation. It follows that strong emergence does not suffer from the empti-
ness that rendered classical emergence insignificant. 
8.  Strong Emergence and the Prospect of a Final Theory 
Strong emergence transcends the boundaries of the chess model of
progress. Emergent laws are ultimate, but not fundamental. They are ultimate
in that they cannot be based on deeper principles, and they fail to be funda-
mental in that they do not apply to the final constituents of matter. Rather,
such ultimate laws refer to composite objects and are essentially holistic in
this sense. Emergent laws make room for discoveries and theories which are
not covered by the most complete account of the elementary entities and their
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interactions. Although strong emergence conflicts with the chess model in
that these emergent laws are irreducible in principle to the laws governing the
fundamental constituents of matter, it does not strictly rule out the formula-
tion of a final theory. The immediate conclusion to be drawn from strong
emergence only concerns the structure of the final theory. Namely, this theo-
ry has to contain principles that irreducibly refer to composite objects. There
is no way to account for all there is by exclusively relying on a micro-theory
such as the standard model of particle physics. In contrast to Weinberg’s con-
tention (1992, 55), not all arrows of explanation converge on the standard
model (see sec. 1, 6). 
But this minimalist conclusion can be expanded in a cautious way. It is
true, I argued for strong emergence only with respect to the equivalence
classes among functions and their realizations. But I take this one type of
examples to suggest that there are other properties of composite objects that
exhibit a similarly intricate relationship to the properties of the fundamental
constituents of matter. It is likely that there are more layers of reality, each
governed in part by laws irreducible to those of completed particle physics. 
In case this somewhat speculative conjecture is borne out, reality exhibits
the structure of a “Borgesian library.” This metaphor was articulated by Ian
Hacking. It suggests that there is no single Book of Nature, but a library,
each book of which is as brief as possible, yet each book of which is incon-
sistent with every other. No book is redundant. For every book, there is some
humanly accessible bit of Nature such that that book, and no other, makes
possible the comprehension, prediction and influencing of what is going on.
(Hacking 1983, 219) 
The picture is that reality is like a patchwork. Each of the patches can be
described by an account that is unobjectionable in empirical as well as
methodological respects. But the accounts of different patches do not mesh;
they do not grow into a uniform fabric. 
The notion of strong emergence and the examples presented in its favor
serve to flesh out this general scheme, but at the same time they amend it. In
contrast to Hacking’s Borgesian vision, the theoretical layers separated by
strong emergence are not inconsistent; they are unrelated. A strongly emer-
gent theory of composite objects does not contradict a possible final theory
of fundamental entities. Rather, both theories fail to account for the entire
domain of relevant properties. 
Strong emergence lends plausibility to Hacking’s Borgesian picture. It
makes one realize how a layered structure of theories, whose strate are sepa-
rated by irremovable gaps of irreducibility, could come about in the first
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place. Once this notion is established, it is only a short step to surmise that a
large number of additional such layers could exist, likewise separated from
the fundamental one and yet essential for a comprehensive understanding of
nature. 
Strong emergence is the key to bringing the notion of ongoing progress
in basic science into harmony with scientific realism. The initial worry was
that should science improve its performance unceasingly, it is apparently
bound to reach an end-state in which all truths are in (see sec. 1). Emergence
offers a prospect such that new basic issues may arise and science progress
without exhausting nature. As science proceeds, new sets of ultimate proper-
ties and laws concerning different layers of organization are brought within
our horizons and offer pristine ground for theoretical work. I granted before
that the mere existence of strong emergence fails to underwrite the notion of
unending progress. Commitment to a multiplicity of such properties or laws
is needed. But, first, if strong emergence is admitted in one case, other exam-
ples are likely to come up, and, second, it becomes clear that, conceptually
speaking, the minimum investment necessary to make scientific realism com-
patible with the unboundedness of scientific progress in basic matters is the
assumption of strongly emergent laws. That is, non-exhaustive realism can be
made coherent by assuming strong emergence. 
This consideration shows that Rescher’s attempt to base the unbounded-
ness of progress on features of science rather than nature goes awry. Strong
emergence is a contingent matter whose appearance is in no way guaranteed
by the particulars of “information-acquiring processes” (see sec. 3). The
chess model of scientific progress is not invalidated by the structure of scien-
ce or the mere complexity of nature. This takes a special level of complexi-
ty; what is required is strong emergence. 
Rescher’s combinatorial analogy concerning endless scientific progress
tacitly presupposes strong emergence and thus assumes a contribution on the
part of nature. 
The example of written text in fact provides a helpful analogy for the sort
of complexity in cognitive stratification that can underwrite the prospect of
unending scientific discovery. Knowing the frequencies of the letters a and t
in a certain group of texts yields virtually nothing as to the frequency of the
word at. The laws of a given level of discovery need not anticipate or deter-
mine those of another. (Rescher 1999, 82) 
This example turns on the consideration of two largely independent sets
of properties, namely, syntactic and semantic properties. Mere combinatorial
complexity does not suffice. Lots of algorithms can be conceived that pro-
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duce strings of letters such that the probability that an a is followed by a t can
be estimated accurately. This anticipation is thwarted because meaning is
used as a means for ordering letters, and this property is inaccessible at the
syntactic level of combining letters. I argued elsewhere that semantic equi-
valence (i.e., sameness of meaning) and physical equivalence (i.e., referential
identity) exhibit the same peculiarity of reciprocal heterogeneous multiplici-
ty and thus constitute another example of strong emergence (Carrier 2000c,
545-546). Rescher’s combinatorial analogy is sound; but it rests on the tacit
premise of strong emergence. 
The moral can be applied to the relationship between reality and scienti-
fic change. The ideas that reality is stratified and that basic research in scien-
ce can go on perpetually rest on the contingent assumption that strong emer-
gence occurs. Science can only progress endlessly if nature lends a helping
hand.4
9.  Conclusion 
Strong emergence provides a key to bringing scientific realism into har-
mony with the assumption that basic scientific progress goes on indefinitely.
By searching for emergent laws, basic progress may survive the exhaustion
of fundamental laws. My claim is that there is a promising candidate for
strong emergence, namely, the property of “being of the same kind” with
respect to relations between functions and their realizations. Recourse to
functions may establish equivalence classes among physical entities that can-
not be identified by relying on physical criteria alone. Recourse to mecha-
nisms may introduce equivalence classes among functions that cannot be
captured by using functional criteria. Neither level can be abandoned in favor
of the other. The symmetry of the situation contrasts with the unidirectional
dependence that is required for a reductive relationship. We are faced with
theoretical clusters that remain separate for reasons of principle. The princi-
ple is that a relation of reciprocal multiplicity obtains between some of the
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relevant equivalence classes – and this is constitutive of strong emergence.
The type of emergentism sketched here is minimalist in that it only refers to
kinds of similarity, not to individual events (as Broad’s classical emergentism
has it).   
Multiple realization simpliciter and reciprocal heterogeneous multiplici-
ty are different in at least one crucial respect. The impact of multiple realiza-
tion may be constrained by arguments of the sort rehearsed earlier: there is
only one true story, namely, the micro-story (see sec. 6). The more unifying
account is introduced only because of the epistemic weakness of humans. We
are at a loss to make sense of all the molecular details. Reciprocal multiplici-
ty is distinct in that each of the two approaches, i.e., the functional and the
physical one, is more detailed in one respect and more unifying in another.
The situation is symmetrical. This blocks the easy way of choosing one of the
approaches as fundamental and the other as derivative. Rather than a unidi-
rectional relationship of premise and consequence, we encounter a sort of
complementarity in Niels Bohr’s sense. Bohr’s notion combines inconsisten-
cy and unavoidability. The two approaches at issue involve incompatible
equivalence classes which are jointly requisite for an exhaustive elucidation
of the phenomena. 
This suggests a picture of a stratified reality without one distinguished set
of laws capable of capturing the totality of phenomena. Progress will be end-
less if science succeeds in uncovering ultimate laws at every layer. Strongly
emergent properties are governed by such ultimate laws, and they can be
shown to exist. I conclude that the odds aren’t that bad for incessant basic
progress of science. 
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